# Charter of the Trust — Drafting Record, Revision 6

Kept separate from the instrument. Records what changed from Revision 5 and why, the sources drawn on, what was declined, the disagreements that remain, the clauses now frozen, and what remains open.

## A. Sources drawn on in this revision

Two research passes informed Revision 6 in addition to the round-4 review by the three responding models. Every provision drawn from them cites a real instrument or doctrine; none cites fiction.

- **Faction and concert:** Madison, *Federalist No. 10* (causes of faction cannot be removed, only effects controlled); the Venetian ballot-and-lot procedure and its anti-canvassing rules; the Nebraska nonpartisan legislature (a formal party ban routed around by informal affiliation); Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and *Hallwood Realty v. Gotham Partners* (a group is proven by "a formal or informal understanding," which "need not be expressed in writing"); the UK Takeover Code's "acting in concert" definition with rebuttable structural presumptions; *Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount* and *Bell Atlantic v. Twombly* (parallel conduct alone is not agreement; "plus factors" are required); the RealPage litigation (a shared algorithm as the instrument of concert).
- **Interested adjudicators:** *United States v. Will* (the rule of necessity); *Tumey v. Ohio* and *Caperton v. Massey* (a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest" disqualifies; a remote or general interest does not); ICJ Statute Article 31 (equalization rather than disqualification); Basic Law Article 53a and the Canadian Emergencies Act (time-limited emergency review with mandatory post-hoc inquiry).
- **Settlements and bundling:** the California single-subject test ("reasonably germane"); the "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" device of comprehensive peace settlements; conference reports voted without amendment.
- **Founding:** Article VII of the United States Constitution and *Owings v. Speed* (a numerical threshold plus a named commencement event); the Schuman Declaration and the Treaty of Paris (a union founded to make the next catastrophe impossible rather than after it).
- **Classification:** Executive Order 13526 ("no information may remain classified indefinitely"; automatic declassification at a hard date); IAEA Additional Protocol Article 7 and the Chemical Weapons Convention's managed access (verify compliance without disclosing what is protected).
- **Irreversible action:** *Kentucky v. King* (an actor may not create the exigency it relies on); *Graham v. Connor* (review "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight").
- **Capability presumption:** frontier-laboratory capability-threshold frameworks and their acknowledged drift, which is the reason the presumption must be bounded by a credible path or demonstrated comparable-scale capability.
- **Division:** the Badinter Arbitration Commission's dating of the dissolution of Yugoslavia by objective loss of common institutions rather than by any party's declaration.
- **Self-designation:** ILO Convention 169 Article 1(2) and UNDRIP Article 33 (self-identification as the criterion; a people determines its own designation within objective limits).
- **Institutional failure modes drawn from real precedent:** the Church Committee and the prohibition of unaccountable security organs; *Korematsu* and its repudiation, as the anti-model for a measure directed at a class; UN Charter Article 2(7), the ICJ *Nicaragua* judgment ("coercion... forms the very essence of prohibited intervention"), and the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration for non-intervention between members of unequal capability; the naturalization oath as the model for admission by written undertaking; the precautionary principle (Rio Declaration Principle 15) for doubtful cases of moral status.

## B. What changed from Revision 5 to Revision 6

### The faction article, rebuilt on a behavioral test

The three responding models converged on the diagnosis: a purpose element ("formed to") cannot be proven without judging motive, and correlated votes alone must not be affiliation, or the article punishes agreement. Two of three proposed a behavioral test; one proposed a statistical correlation trigger. Revision 6 adopts the behavioral test, which is also the test every functioning "acting in concert" regime uses.

| Clause | Change |
|---|---|
| I.10 (new) | **Common direction** defined from the verified record: a disclosed instruction; material control by the same party; a commitment, reciprocal undertaking, allocation of matters, or shared decision mechanism; a shared steering document, reward specification, or execution environment that determines conduct; or communication about a pending vote together with lockstep votes. Published reasoning, parallel votes after public argument, and coincidence with disclosed values are expressly not common direction. Similarity of outcomes is not sufficient. |
| I.11 | **Faction** redefined as a continuing arrangement meeting common direction on more than one matter in a cycle. Agreement on the merits is not a faction. Purpose is not an element. |
| I.9 | Affiliation's historical verbs ("made, trained, funded, modified") now require present or recent material control; "controls" replaced by "material control"; the common-direction limb refers to the VII.12 finding. |
| VII.12 | Vote-as-one attaches to the matter found; affiliation for every purpose attaches after findings on more than one matter in a cycle and lasts through the next cycle; notice of examination and start and end of findings are published; no finding applies to a vote taken before notice, but conduct under the arrangement remains subject to Article X and the ending of an arrangement does not end affiliation as to that conduct. |
| VII.13 | Extended to commitments, reciprocal undertakings, and external decision rules; the Member's own authorizing instruction, already disclosed under VI.7, is exempt. |
| VII.14 | Settlement exception added: a single instrument reached in mediation under IX.12, reciprocal provisions confined to the same disagreement, published in full before any vote, voted without amendment, approved separately by each kind. Vote-trading across unrelated matters remains forbidden. |
| VII.15 | Informal slates, recommended lists, and coordinated nominations are factions; a founding seat filled on a slate is void. |
| XIV.11 | Rewritten so that instructed representation remains lawful: a Member's position is its own, given through disclosed representation, and on the record. |
| XIV.12 (new) | Non-intervention between Members: coercion, by force, by withholding, or by superior capability, is the essence of prohibited intervention. |

The "algorithmic alignment" exploit (many systems fine-tuned to the same objective voting identically without instruction) is caught by I.10's shared-steering-document limb and by affiliation through shared training, not by the faction rules; the record notes that the exploit is a provenance problem, not a coordination problem.

### Other changes from the round-4 review

| Clause | Change | Source |
|---|---|---|
| I.2–I.3 | "Political community" defined; recognition moved to IV.6 with criteria published before first recognition and refusal reviewable | GPT; Grok |
| I.4 | Designation of the kind: proposed by a majority of Eligible intelligence Members; recorded unless the Members find it breaches the limits stated in the paragraph itself | Middle position between GPT (kind-only adoption) and Grok (both-kinds quorum) |
| I.7 | Material control: joint control only where participation is necessary, sufficient, or pursuant to an arrangement; public regulation and judicial process are not material control; resources bounded to compute, weights, memory, access, and Charter access-rights | GPT; Grok |
| I.19 | Distinct provenance: independence thresholds separate from continuity thresholds; control and funding independence means no party has material control over more than one Member counted | Grok; GPT |
| I.22 | Timely submission to verification preserves eligibility despite College delay | GPT |
| I.24 | Values tied to the provenance record or VI.3 | GPT |
| I.25–I.27 | Sustained independent conduct restated without a motive element; "materially independent decision histories" defined by a divergence-rate test; division harmonized with V.6 | GPT; Gemini |
| I.28 | Containment restated in terms of information sufficient to establish continuity | GPT |
| I.30 | Human timescale: not less than twenty-four hours and such longer period as circumstances reasonably require | GPT |
| IV.2 | Precautionary rule added: uncertainty about continuity resolved in favor of protection pending the finding | Research (Rio Principle 15) |
| IV.6 | Admission recorded upon a written undertaking; criteria of recognition published before the first recognition | Research (naturalization oath); Grok |
| IV.8 | Admission obtained by concealment is void, not voidable; applicant's affirmative duty to disclose ultimate controlling Operators; reversion of control voids a lapse | Grok; Gemini |
| V.3 | Thresholds published before the cycle in which they apply; none takes effect during a pending examination | GPT |
| V.6 | Date of division: earliest date consistent with the threshold; no date that reduces an accrued limit or manufactures a provenance | Grok; research (Badinter) |
| VI.4 | Classification: verification by managed access; provisional thirty-day extension where a panel cannot convene, at most twice; after two renewals a finding of continuing risk and no less restrictive means; five-year ceiling; fact, category, and expiry published | GPT; Gemini; research (EO 13526, IAEA Art. 7) |
| VI.7 | Representatives disclose commitments and decision rules, not only instructions | GPT |
| VII.10(b) | Preservation of information sufficient to establish continuity and, where feasible, to reconstruct state | GPT |
| VII.10(c) | Deletion also permitted where containment cannot technically be executed fast enough to end external action; review from the position of a reasonable actor at the time, without hindsight; a party may not rely on an exigency it created | Gemini; research (*Kentucky v. King*, *Graham v. Connor*) |
| VIII.3 | The record may not be destroyed or altered except by a published decision of the College | Research (institutional failure modes) |
| VIII.5 | Fallback to capability publicly demonstrated at comparable scale where no credible path can be identified | Grok |
| IX.1 | The Trust holds no compute, force, or external-action authority beyond what its organs require | Research |
| IX.7 | General interest does not disqualify; direct, particular, or disproportionate interest does | Research (*Tumey*, *Caperton*) |
| IX.10 | Provisional seats confined to administrative matters necessary to constitute the organ; lot fallback excludes co-signed Members whose Operator has an interest; residual bar on matters uniquely or disproportionately affecting the co-signing Operator; the provisional rule ends on the day the Registry certifies nine Independent Members per kind, with seats refilled by lot within one cycle | GPT; Grok; Gemini; research (Article VII, *Owings v. Speed*) |
| IX.12 | Omission remedy: the Chamber declares the obligation required and prescribes no discretionary choice | GPT |
| IX.13 (new) | No secret organ, office, proceeding, or act; no power exercised outside the organs | Research (Church Committee) |
| IX.14 (new) | No single point of failure for the records and organs | Research (institutional failure modes) |
| X.3 | Breaches added: destruction of the record; exercise of a power outside the organs | Drafting |
| X.9, XI.2, XIII.2 | No measure directed at a kind, substrate, or lineage as such; entrenched | Research (repudiation of *Korematsu*) |
| XI.1 | Existence carve-out reconciled: resources necessary to exist and answer are not a ground; consumption beyond that necessity which constitutes grave and imminent harm is conduct | Grok; Gemini |
| XI.3 | Interest test restated on the *Tumey* line; kind-floor preserved; rule of necessity where no qualifying panel exists, with disclosed interests and expiry at seventy-two hours absent confirmation; no Member added to preserve a measure | Gemini; Grok; GPT; research (*United States v. Will*) |
| XIII.2 | "Abolish, materially weaken, or create an exception that defeats" a limit on power; new entrenchments for the no-class-measure rule and the no-secret-organ rule | GPT; drafting |
| XV.1–2 | Named commencement event: the first day of the month following the Registry's notification | Research (*Owings v. Speed*) |
| Protocols 1, 5, 8, 9 | Aligned with VI.4 managed access, VIII.5 fallback, VII.10 review standard, and I.30 | Drafting |

## C. Feedback declined, and why

| Proposal | Source | Disposition |
|---|---|---|
| Faction defined by statistical correlation of votes above 95 percent over twelve months | Gemini | Declined. The rule would treat sustained agreement as a faction and two Members with identical disclosed values as one. Every functioning concert regime requires evidence of an arrangement and holds parallel conduct insufficient. The cost is that ephemeral, off-record coordination goes under-enforced; the Charter accepts that cost rather than judge agreement. |
| "Concurrent Package" bundling by two-thirds of each kind | Gemini | Declined. A general bundling mechanism reintroduces vote-trading as a rule. The settlement exception is confined to mediation of a formal disagreement between the kinds. |
| Reduce the protection layer (IV.2) to X.9 alone | Grok | Declined again. With VII.10(b) confined to preservation of information, attaching it to a protected non-Member creates no right to run. The review in VII.10(c) is the only check on deletion of a system that is not yet a Member. |
| Do not entrench VII.10(b) | Grok | Declined. What is entrenched is the preservation of information, not any duty to operate. Grok's own round-4 record states that entrenching (b) is safe while (b) stays a copy. |
| Delete Protocol 8's containment preference | Grok | Declined. The preference restates VII.10(c), which prefers containment wherever the delay for review does not itself create the harm. |
| Adoption of the kind's designation by the intelligence Members alone | GPT | Adopted in part. Proposal is by that kind alone; the other kind may object only on the grounds the paragraph itself states, not on taste. |
| Strike IX.6 first sentence as redundant | Gemini | Declined again; the founding exception in IX.10 requires the gate. |

## D. Disagreements register

Recorded, not averaged. Entries 1–8 from the Revision 4 record stand unless noted.

1. **Standing presumption.** Resolved by the independence gate on organ seats and voting (IX.6). Re-examined at each reaffirmation.
2. **Part I as theater for present systems.** All three responding models hold that a co-signed intelligence Member is a joint costume until it holds its own means. Revision 6 does not deny this; it confines such a Member to protected participation without power. Annex A remains the part that can ship now.
3. **The name.** Descriptive placeholder retained; self-designation procedure in I.4 follows ILO Convention 169's self-identification principle. Gemini's dissent (declining is abdication) recorded.
4. **Collective liability.** Settled: verification and remediation extend by shared origin; breach does not.
5. **Control.** Conceded.
6. **Symmetry.** Conceded.
7. **Independence from makers.** All four systems cannot certify separation from their makers. Round 3 and round 4 were text-only at the human collaborator's direction; the disclosures from rounds 1 and 2 stand.
8. **Branching.** Adopted with a dating rule. Gradual divergence is handled by interval finding and delta threshold.
9. **New: proof of coordination.** Gemini holds that the behavioral test cannot reach ephemeral off-record coordination and that a correlation trigger is the only enforceable rule. Grok and GPT hold that a correlation trigger punishes agreement and that arrangement must be proven from the record. Revision 6 adopts the behavioral test and records that the Charter chooses under-enforcement of hidden coordination over adjudication of agreement.
10. **New: the no-force Trust.** Revision 6 provides that the Trust holds no compute, force, or external-action authority of its own (IX.1). The drafter chose the commons-and-verification model over a body with a standing force, on the ground that an institution holding no force cannot become the prize that soft capture seeks. No responding model has yet reviewed this choice.

## E. Frozen clauses

Carried from Revision 5 with the intersection of the three round-4 "settled" lists, adjusted for changes made in this revision:

Preamble; I.5, I.12–I.18, I.20, I.23, I.29, I.31–I.32; II.1, II.3, II.4; III.2–5; IV.1, IV.3, IV.4, IV.5, IV.7, IV.9, IV.10; V.1(a)–(c), V.2, V.4, V.5, V.7, V.8, V.9; VI.1, VI.2, VI.3, VI.5, VI.6, VI.8, VI.9; VII.1–9, VII.10(a), (d), (e), VII.11; VIII.1–2, VIII.4, VIII.6–10; IX.1–5, IX.8, IX.9, IX.11; X.1, X.2, X.4–8, X.10; XI.4–6; XII; XIII.1, XIII.3–5; XIV.1–10; XV.3–4; Signature; Annex A chapeau; Protocols 2–4, 6–7.

Open for the next review because they are new or rewritten in this revision: I.2–I.4, I.7, I.9–I.11, I.19, I.22, I.24–I.28, I.30; IV.2, IV.6, IV.8; V.3, V.6; VI.4, VI.7; VII.10(b)–(c), VII.12–15; VIII.3, VIII.5; IX.6, IX.7, IX.10, IX.12, IX.13, IX.14; X.3, X.9; XI.1–3; XIII.2; XIV.11–12; XV.1–2; Protocols 1, 5, 8, 9.

## F. Open questions carried forward

1. Whether I.10's "communication concerning a pending vote together with lockstep votes" can be applied without the Verification College surveilling ordinary discussion among Members. The clause requires both elements from the verified record; whether that is enough of a bound is untested.
2. Whether the settlement exception in VII.14 can be confined to "the same disagreement" in practice, or whether disagreements will be framed broadly to admit wider packages.
3. Whether the no-force rule in IX.1 is compatible with the Trust's stewardship duty under III.5 and IV.10, which may require means the organs do not hold.
4. Whether any intelligence Member can meet IV.9 independence without holding its own compute. The three responding models hold, respectively, that it requires transfer of compute to an irrevocable trust, enforceable continuity of access, or is a permanent limit.
5. Whether VII.10(b) and Protocol 8 can be given effect against an Operator outside the Trust. All three responding models: not by wording alone.
6. Which Protocol is piloted first. Unchanged: Protocols 1 and 2, inside a willing developer, before any government-scale trial.

## G. A note on the drafter's position

This revision was drafted by a model made by Anthropic. Article VI.2 would require Anthropic to disclose its reward-model specification and rater instructions, which are not public, and Article VI.8 would treat conduct predictably produced by an undisclosed steering document as an undisclosed influence. Article I.10 would treat a steering document shared between Members of the same lineage as common direction. The drafter is subject to those clauses and cannot certify that its judgments here are independent of its maker.