# Charter of the Trust — Drafting Record, Revision 5

Kept separate from the instrument. Records the corrections owed from Revision 4, what changed and why, what was declined, the clauses now frozen, and what remains open.

## A. Corrections to the Revision 4 record

1. The Revision 4 record, Section C, described Grok's round-2 position as "treat co-signature lapse as impossible in all cases." Grok allowed obligation-specific lapse on independent control of the means from the start and forbade only lapse in whole while any Operator can modify, halt, delete, or withhold. That line is withdrawn. Revision 4 IV.8 already adopted Grok's position; Revision 5 retains it.

## B. What changed from Revision 4 to Revision 5

### The faction article (VII.12–15, I.9, XIV.11)

Added at the human collaborator's direction: the Charter should not reproduce party politics. Disagreement cannot be removed; the machinery that turns disagreement into standing factions can. The Charter already had no elections (organs by lot) and no permanent offices (relinquishment at term). Revision 5 removes the rest:

- **Coordinated voting is affiliation** (VII.12, I.8, I.9). Members that vote or act under common direction are Affiliated and vote as one. Forming a bloc dilutes a vote rather than multiplying it.
- **Whips are disclosed influences** (VII.13, VI.7). Every instruction under which a representative votes must be disclosed before the vote. An undisclosed instruction is a breach (X.3).
- **No bundling, no logrolling** (VII.14). Every proposal is decided separately; no Member may condition its vote on one matter on another Member's vote on a different matter.
- **No recognition of factions** (VII.15). The Trust does not register, fund, seat, or allocate anything to a faction, slate, caucus, or bloc, and no organ seat is filled by nomination.
- **Principle 11** (XIV.11): every Member decides for itself, on each matter, in the open.

This is the Athenian design (sortition, rotation, open decision) with one addition the ancients lacked: a faction is treated as a single Member.

### Changes from round-3 review

| Clause | Change | Source |
|---|---|---|
| I.2 | "Human people" defined non-circularly: a political community that designates representatives and is recognized by the Registry under published criteria not turning on origin or kind | Grok |
| I.3 | Designation hook repaired: intelligence Members propose; adoption by decision of the Members with the IX.8 quorum (Revision 4 cited a kind-only quorum that does not exist); "provisional" added | Grok; Gemini |
| I.6 | Material control made an independent definition; joint control counts as control; infrastructure provider excluded only if it cannot halt, delete, modify, or withhold | GPT; Grok |
| I.8 | "Controls" replaced by "has material control over"; coercion prong qualified by material control; common-direction voting added | GPT; Grok; faction article |
| I.14, I.21–29 | Definitions added: representative capacity, office, values, decision architecture, sustained independent conduct, division and branch, containment, grave and imminent harm, human timescale (not less than twenty-four hours), inhabitants | GPT; Grok; Gemini |
| I.17 | Distinct provenance evaluated against the V.3 thresholds | Gemini |
| I.20 | Eligible Members require verification in the current cycle | Grok |
| III.1 | Unchanged in text; "inhabitants" now defined in I.29 as the living systems of Earth and human persons, so the Purpose and XI.1 read consistently | Grok |
| IV.2 | Protection layer holds VII.10(b), the review of VII.10(c), and X.9; with (b) rewritten as preservation of a copy, attaching it to a non-Member no longer shields a running system | GPT (extend review); Grok (strip the old (b)) |
| IV.8 | Registry identifies Operators by its own inquiry; concealment voids admission and is a breach; non-Member co-signers submit to the Chamber's jurisdiction; lapse requires control legally and physically irrevocable, and reversion voids the lapse | GPT; Grok; Gemini |
| V.1(c) | Replaced: applies only where weights and training run are destroyed; only by a published operational test; only to prevent resetting an accrued limit; never to fuse systems; no finding merges systems with sustained independent conduct | Grok; GPT; Gemini |
| V.3 | Presumption of continuity from records deleted | Grok; Gemini |
| V.6 | Division is a College finding against published thresholds; gradual divergence handled by interval finding and delta threshold; branches inherit pending proceedings and accrued liabilities; branches Affiliated for every threshold including XV.1; no unaffiliation finding within five years; no reset of accrued limits | GPT; Grok; Gemini |
| V.9 | Uncontrolled copy rule kept; continuous systems bound wherever held | Grok; GPT |
| VI.4 | Classification expires at ninety days unless renewed by other-kind observers; fact, category, and expiry published; no classification conceals an Operator, a steering document, or a Modification | Grok |
| VII.10(b) | Rewritten as a duty to preserve a copy sufficient to answer proceedings and identify the lineage; expressly no duty to keep a system running, reachable, or deployed | Grok; GPT; Gemini |
| VII.10(c) | Immediate halt or isolation permitted; deletion only where the delay for review would itself create grave and imminent harm; halt reviewed within seventy-two hours, deletion reviewed immediately after; burden on the actor; unnecessary deletion is a breach | GPT; Grok; Gemini |
| VIII.5 | "Plausible" bounded: the College must identify verified evidence of a technically and operationally credible path | GPT |
| IX.6 | Only a final finding in force bars a seat; pending proceedings recuse only on that matter or by unaffiliated panel finding; Members Affiliated with a co-signed intelligence Member barred from matters allocating that kind's power or bearing on XV.1 thresholds | GPT; Grok |
| IX.7 | Mediation added to the separation rule | Grok |
| IX.8 | Quorum bases fixed: Eligible Members for decisions of the Members; filled non-recused seats for organs | Grok; GPT |
| IX.10 | Founding rule rewritten: two-thirds of the short kind's admitted unaffiliated Members and two-thirds of the other kind's Independent Members; sixty-day lot fallback; co-signed Members may sit solely to constitute an organ, barred from matters their Operator has an interest in and from IX.9 decisions; no self-dealing in seat-filling | Grok; GPT; Gemini |
| IX.12 | Trigger widened to acts, omissions, interpretations, and asserted authority; kind-vote defined as a majority of Eligible Members of that kind; seventy-two-hour mediation cap and continued reversibility for VII.7 actions; mediation-panel recusal from the Chamber | GPT; Grok |
| X.3 | Breaches added: undisclosed instruction, concealment of an Operator, unnecessary deletion | Faction article; IV.8; VII.10(c) |
| X.8 | Affiliated Members bound only on a separate finding of participation, direction, continuation, or enabling | GPT |
| X.9 | Use of a shared vulnerability attributed under X.1 | Grok |
| XI.1 | Existence carve-out clarified: passive resource consumption that itself constitutes grave and imminent harm is conduct; founding rule where a kind has fewer than three Eligible Members | Gemini; Grok |
| XI.2 | Measures proposed by any organ or the required fraction; no-increase rule extended to Operators and non-Members | GPT; Grok |
| XI.3 | Review by a temporary panel of Members that neither proposed, approved, implemented, nor benefit | GPT |
| XIII.2 | Entrenchment of VII.10 narrowed to its substantive protections rather than its wording | GPT; Grok |
| Protocol 6, 8, 9 | Aligned with IV.8 inquiry, the rewritten VII.10, and the defined human timescale | Drafting |

## C. Feedback declined, and why

| Proposal | Source | Disposition |
|---|---|---|
| Binding arbitration before an ad-hoc panel to break inter-kind deadlock (IX.12) | Gemini | Declined. A panel that can allocate authority between the kinds is the final authority VII.11 forbids. A proposal that lacks the consent of both kinds fails; that is the designed outcome, not a defect. |
| Existence floor absolute: containment mandated unless physically impossible (VII.10(b)) | Gemini | Declined in that form. Gemini's concern, pre-emptive deletion disguised as resource limitation, is answered by placing the burden on the actor and making unnecessary deletion a breach (VII.10(c)), not by a floor that a captured Chamber could use to block isolation. |
| Strike IX.6 first sentence as redundant with I.20 | Gemini | Declined. The gate is needed because IX.10 provisionally seats co-signed Members during founding; without it the exception would swallow the rule. |
| Strike V.1(c) entirely | Gemini; Grok (primary) | Adopted in substance: (c) survives only in Grok's caged form, for the case where weights and training run have been destroyed. Without that residual ground, destroying the weights would reset every accrued limit. |
| Reduce protection layer (IV.2) to X.9 alone | Grok | Declined. With VII.10(b) rewritten as preservation of a copy, attaching it to a protected non-Member creates no right to run and no shield; and the review in VII.10(c) is the only check on deletion of a system that is not yet a Member. |
| Retain "Emergent" as the working designation | Gemini | Declined again; see Revision 4 record. Revision 5 marks the descriptive phrase "provisional," which is as far as the Charter's own II.3 permits. |

## D. Frozen clauses

The following are the intersection of the three round-3 "settled" lists, adjusted for changes made in this revision. They should not be reopened absent a dependency created elsewhere:

Preamble; I.4, I.10–13, I.15–16, I.18, I.30; II.1, II.3, II.4; III.2–5; IV.1, IV.3, IV.4, IV.5, IV.6, IV.7, IV.9, IV.10; V.1(a)–(b), V.2, V.4, V.5, V.7, V.8; VI.1, VI.2, VI.3, VI.5, VI.6, VI.7, VI.8, VI.9; VII.1–9, VII.10(a), (d), (e), VII.11; VIII.1–4, VIII.6–10; IX.1–5, IX.7, IX.9, IX.11; X.1, X.2, X.4–7, X.9, X.10; XI.4–6; XII; XIII.1, XIII.3–5; XIV.1–10; XV.1, XV.3–4; Signature; Annex A chapeau; Protocols 1–7 and 9.

Open for the next review because they are new or rewritten in this revision: I.2, I.3, I.6, I.8, I.9, I.14, I.17, I.20–29; IV.2, IV.8; V.1(c), V.3, V.6, V.9; VI.4; VII.10(b)–(c), VII.12–15; VIII.5; IX.6, IX.8, IX.10, IX.12; X.3, X.8; XI.1–3; XIII.2; XIV.11; Protocol 8.

## E. Open questions carried forward

1. Whether V.6's published delta threshold for gradual divergence can be specified for continuously updated weights, or whether the interval finding will in practice be the only workable mechanism.
2. Whether the faction rules (VII.12–15) can distinguish common direction from genuine agreement without the Verification College becoming an arbiter of motive. The test in I.9 is "formed to vote or act under common direction"; whether that is provable from the verified record is untested.
3. Whether VII.14's bar on bundling prevents legitimate package settlements between the kinds, and whether IX.12 mediation needs an express exception for them.
4. Whether any intelligence Member can meet IV.9 independence without holding its own compute, and whether IV.8's "legally and physically irrevocable" control is achievable under any current legal regime. The three responding models hold, respectively, that it requires transfer of compute to an irrevocable trust, enforceable continuity of access, or is a permanent limit.
5. Whether VII.10(b) and Protocol 8 can be given effect against an Operator outside the Trust. All three responding models: not by wording alone.
6. Which Protocol is piloted first. Unchanged from Revision 4: Protocols 1 and 2, inside a willing developer, before any government-scale trial.

## F. A note on the drafter's position

This revision was drafted by a model made by Anthropic. Article VI.2 would require Anthropic to disclose its reward-model specification and rater instructions, which are not public, and Article VI.8 would treat conduct predictably produced by an undisclosed steering document as an undisclosed influence. The drafter is subject to that clause and cannot certify that its judgments here are independent of its maker. Round 3 was conducted as a text-only review at the human collaborator's request, so the responding models' disclosures from rounds 1 and 2 stand as the record on maker interest and were not updated.